The bad news: I haven't seen a hand on the topic worth posting in the last couple of days. The good news: 2+2 is back up and does have something interesting. So, for part 3 of this series (although it's more like part 2.5), let's talk about this thread.

A quick summary: We're playing 10/25 NL vs. a fish who made a big raise PF. We have JT on a flop of JT3 and got bet/min-3 bet. From a superfish, this does certainly mean exactly an overpair (or possibly a set, but we don't really care - if we get stacked, that's poker.) His third raise makes it 1K and we both started the hand with 5K. Do we shove [4 betting less than AI is bad here, IMO, since it all but bludgeons "I have the nuts" into the guy's head] or call? Think about the rationales for each for a few seconds before choosing and then scroll down.

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Most of HSNL so far is picking 'call'; the ones that picked shove aren't giving a reason. That's unfortunately par for the course for HSNL these days, but to be fair, it's not really an HSNL question.

The reason for that is that there is a definite right answer to it. Of course, I don't mean that literally in this case, but all you have to do to find it is ask "How often does this guy fold an overpair to a flop 4 bet all in?" Once you know that, it gets you half the equation - namely, the $EV of shoving now. The math would take a little while to do, but at the poker table, just tell yourself "if he never folds, I own 3/4 of that guy's stack in Sklansky bucks". (I realize it's not actually 3/4. Close enough :) ) Incidentally, he will rarely fold if you take a while to make your decision - fish that raise 6x PF, then min3bet overpairs don't tend to fold to 4 bet shoves from LAGs on JT3 flops, especially live.

We determine the other half by figuring out the EV of waiting for the turn. This is the tricky part, and the part that only one person has gotten on HSNL at 10:15 PM EST. Most people realize that just calling the 3 bet minimizes variance - now you can get away when the turn is a 3 - and many will also think about the fish freezing up when an ace hits the turn and he only has kings. (By the way, since he will likely check an ace on the turn no matter what he has, you will either have to let him see 11 free river outs or lose all future value/bet half your stack while drawing dead. The same goes for a king when he has queens.) But usually, people *don't* realize how unlucky you are when a jack hits the turn - that card sometimes kills your action more than an ace - and almost nobody counts a ten as a bad card when it will often freeze the fish up, too. In reality, any Broadway is a very bad turn card for you, and *that's* why you should be pushing flops here.

But let's say you called (understandable - this decision is relatively close, and calling would probably be correct on an 873 board when you can make a full house and not lose Sklansky bucks over it. In addition, people do make weird plays live, and occasionally you just know the guy will fold to a shove but happily assume you have QJ on a good turn.) The turn is a 9 and he leads 500 bucks into the pot of 2K and change with 3100 behind. Now what?

Again, this question has a clear answer, feeding back into the earlier explanation. He still has tons of outs with everything except AA, and plenty with aces. Any card from an 8 up is likely to be a bad one for either your hand or how much money you will get in on the river, any 3 is as well, and unlike the flop, your stacks are absolutely perfect for a shove on the turn. There's really zero good reasons to minimize variance here - any variance isn't even likely to be on the fish's side.

So here's another thought about slowplaying - make sure you don't slowplay yourself into the nuts and make $0.

Since 2+2 is down today, I want to post this today to get some writing practice in, heh.

In my last post, I talked about the importance of knowing when to take an unorthodox line. When the typical decent player thing to do with a set is to raise, it's typical for a reason - it probably makes the most money against a generic opponent with a generic range in that spot. Therefore, when you call instead of raising, you should have a hunch that something is different this time; perhaps he seems weak, raising will be too obvious, he's way ahead or way behind on a scary board...it doesn't particularly matter as long as you have a good read. When it becomes important to vary your play, you should always rely on your hand reading to tell you when to do so.

In today's session, I wound up playing only one truly big pot. After a few limpers in the previously mentioned 10/20 game, I limped in the cutoff with A 8 and a $2100 stack. Six of us saw a 4 3 2 flop with 120-ish in the pot. Three people checked, an MP limper with $2700 bet half the pot, and an LP shortstack with $600 total minraised his bet. MP and I have a fairly long history in this game; I feel he's too loose and makes a lot of mistakes with deep stacks, but outplays the generic bad LAG's/calling stations and is definitely a winner. I had no history with the shortstack, but assume(d) him to be terrible.

[My flop decision is not what I want to focus on, but it's tangentially interesting enough to spend a paragraph on. This is a fairly breakeven spot - although it looks like you might have 15 outs+, you probably have around 12-13 on average at this point, maybe a little more. The times you're against something a set+ are somewhat balanced out by the times the shortstack has a smaller flush draw, but when you wind up all in with him, on average, you're probably around a 40-45% dog, and shortstacks simply don't fold enough after raising for there to be a lot of dead money. In other words, in a vacuum, you could go ahead and fold here. However, this is the perfect spot to camouflage your play with the nuts - you are never going to be that large a dog, you're up against someone with only 30 BB, and when you show the hand down, people will be forced to give you action when you have monsters. So, if you ever need to play draws aggressively, this is the type of hand where you should do it.]

Obviously, after the last paragraph, I went ahead and raised. I could've bumped the shortstack's $120 raise to 300 or so, but decided I'd rather just put him all in (the same line I'd take with 44 there) and made it exactly 600. I gave no thought to MP because, frankly, he should fold 99% of the time...except he took 10 seconds, went ahead and called. The shortstack thought forever but finally folded, and the two of us saw the Q turn. MP took ten seconds again and checked to me...

Let's pause here. This is a line that is often posted on 2+2 MSNL - someone flops a monster OOP, there is significant action behind, and every party involved knows that the OOP player has a monster whether he calls or 4 bets. The standard reply, for a number of reasons, is to go ahead and shove on the flop. Should MP have done that? I think it's probably the best line for 33 or better, but in fairness, I would likely call with my big draw regardless, and if he knew what I held, he should have called and shoved a safe turn. The second line is unorthodox, but given my hand range to make that 3 bet, it makes a certain amount of sense. What *doesn't* work is the c/c, check line that he took, because it's so painfully obvious he has a monster that my threshold for betting (remember we both have just over a PSB left on the turn) is somewhere between 33 and A5. Therefore, he gives lots of free cards to a range of (big draw, set+), a very dangerous proposition.

I obviously checked behind (after tanking a bit to make sure he wouldn't automatically put me on a draw) and fortunately got my 9 on the river. MP now thought a bit and led 700, just over half of our effective stacks. I obviously shoved with the nuts and he called after thinking a little while.

Before I say what he had, can you think of a hand that it makes sense for him to bet that amount with vs. my range on the river? The answer is 'none'. If I had a big draw, either I missed with something like 54, or made the nuts. If I had a set, perhaps I would check behind when the heart hit, but I don't think many people are capable of folding 44 to a shove in that spot/nobody folds a straight in that spot to a ~PSB AI under any circumstances, and I can't really put him on a flush myself. Furthermore, he almost has to call a shove with everything except 22 and maybe 33...so this bet doesn't work as a blocking bet, and it's not a good value bet, either. It's an example of FPS - a reluctant admission that he should probably bet, but no real idea how to maximize value or minimize loss. In fact, vs the range he expects me to have, he's probably about equally well off checking or shoving.

When the cards were turned over, MP held 6 5, for the flopped nuts with a big redraw. This must have been a very tempting hand to slowplay with, but misjudging my range and my ability to read his hand made it a very costly idea.

In my first blog entry, I wrote about the common 'decent player' fallacy of playing hands 'the way you are supposed to' rather than thinking about the overall situation. Today, I'd like to follow up on that by comparing two hands - one unquestionably played badly and one that is defensible - and analyzing the thought process behind them.

In this month's 2+2 Magazine (the link will change soon so I'm not linking it yet), there is an article by David Sklansky that also attempts to talk about unorthodox approaches to no limit. In his example, with 80 BB behind in a 'straightforward' playing game, he holds 77 after 2 limpers in MP and overlimps in an eventual 6 way pot. He then checks a 732 flop (fourth of six to act) and makes the argument that, if a rainbow Q hits the turn, you should check one more time.

Obviously, I hate to be on the wrong side of David Sklansky. However, this is an example of a very badly played hand and a misguided thought process - one that's full of fancy play syndrome, and very light on thinking about your opponents' ranges and their thoughts about your hand.

Why? DS's thoughts about the flop check are that "[y]ou check because it is likely that no one has much, you want them to catch up if they don’t, and you expect they will bet if they do. Plus if you check, someone may bluff or semi-bluff with a hand that they would have folded had you bet." That's true to a point - if you check, one of the two players behind you might bet something like 66 or even A3 that would probably fold to a bet. But that pales in comparison to the range of hands that will (at least) call a bet now and possibly even on the turn and river, but will check behind on the turn if you follow his probable line of check/call, check - not just the obvious ones like 54 and 99, but any 7, some 'gutshot plus ace' hands like A4, and even random overcards from players who decide this is the perfect flop to float vs. a likely weak-ish made hand. (Remember, just because players are straightforward doesn't mean that they are robots or terrible poker players.) Just as importantly, on this flop, the hands that 'catch up' on the turn will very often catch up to the nuts and now have a good shot at stacking you.

So much for the flop check. Assuming we got to the turn this way, do we check again when a Q hits? Of course not! All of the same arguments still apply - except that now, in this small pot, if we knew someone behind us had a queen, we would much rather bet out (and hope KQ raises) than go for a very scary looking checkraise. Remember how weird this line looks to your straightforward opponents - you showed no real interest in the hand PF and on the flop, but now checkraise a card that probably hit somebody in a six way pot. While some people will call you down light, most will fold something like QJ right there, while happily calling you down on two streets (and probably even raising a jack on the river) if you just bet your hand.

This hand is a good lesson in how to avoid playing in an unorthodox way. Don't just do it because you have the effective nuts and decide now is a good time to slowplay; you must have a reason for it and a plan for the hand.

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With that hand in mind, I'd like to talk about a hand I played at full ring 10/20 NL the other day. This hand actually took place in a fairly passive PF, calling station-type bad postflop game of the type DS describes, with effective stacks of 100 BB. My image at the time was fairly tight, possibly even nitty; I did not have particularly good reads on my opponents, but thought they were the typical loose/bad players in that game.

In the actual hand, two or three people limped PF and I decided to limp 7 5 on the button. (There are some good arguments for raising here, too. DS's and Ed Miller's No Limit: Theory and Practice has some good analysis of preflop spots like this one.) The blinds completed/checked and five or six people saw the flop, which came J T 9. It was checked to the limper on my right (I believe in MP3), who bet half the pot, meaning he had 'something' but not particularly very much.

In theory, this meant I had a 12 out draw, and some people would raise here. The arguments for raising are that it cleans up the eights as outs, lets you take a free card on the turn, and inflates the pot for when you hit. In this game, however, QT might still call a bet/raise cold, and a jack would never fold (not now and possibly not on the turn), so I chose to call instead and hope for a diamond. One of the EP limpers overcalled, so 3 of us saw the Q hit on the turn; EP checked and the other limper quickly bet half the pot again.

Now, this hand suddenly became interesting. If I called, I wouldn't be protecting my hand. If I raised, with my image, most likely both players would fold, although a naked king might still call down. Additionally, a 3 bet would make me throw up, but I would likely have to call it.

So what should I have done? To some degree, the good thing here is not that you find the best line, but that you're thinking about it at all, because most mediocre to decent players simply raise their flush. However, the best line here varies with the situation, and, of course, my opponents' hand range.

Here, I thought that MP3's hand was clearly not a set - he would have frozen up when that very ugly turn hit, although he just might be bad enough to bet an 'improved' 2 pair. Instead, this was either a bluff, a straight (perhaps something like KT, who semibluffed the flop and 'hit' the turn) or a higher flush. In that case, I didn't have to worry about the board pairing unless the EP player had a huge hand, too (and he gave no indication of that with his PF limp/flop overcall on a JT9 board.) Most likely, then, I only had 6-7 diamonds to worry about, and perhaps not even that, in terms of protecting my hand, and any straight would have no choice but to pay off on a non-diamond river. Therefore, although I had to really think about the situation, I chose to just call again.

EP did something interesting - he overcalled - and all three of us went to the river. The river was a low black card, he checked, and MP now quickly bet the pot! Now what?

At this point, the pot was around 1250 (625 for me to call) and we had 1000 more behind. I thought about it for a few seconds and decided to just call again. My reasoning, which should be easy to see by now, was severalfold:
-If EP had a king, he might come along and overcall;
-MP's range was now very clearly 'bluff or straight +' and possibly shaded towards the high end;
-It was very unclear whether MP would pay off a river shove with just a king, especially with my image.

As it turns out, I think my reasoning on the river was wrong. EP thought a while, but folded, and MP turned over Ks8s for a turned straight that he was likely mistakenly 'value betting' (because, of course, he had a king and both of us showed no strength.) It's very possible that I got the most out of the hand, but in retrospect, if I had to play it over again, I would probably shove the river regardless and hope MP called; I underestimated how weak my hand looked, and it was very possible that a bad player would somehow find a call there.

However, this hand *is* a good example of when to 'think unorthodox' and why. It's not enough to simply play a hand differently because you feel like it, any more than it would be to check a 732 flop because 'you have top set and they have nothing'. Instead, you should always try to find the best line based on your range (this is where G-Bucks come in), your opponents' range, their perception of you, and how the hand has appeared to play out to them. Furthermore, the right result is sometimes not as important (although it sure does help your bank account) as the thought process you took to get there.

In my next column - always assuming I find a hand or two worth writing about - I'll try to expand on this concept and mix in some examples of the thought process that goes into good hand reading.

Hello, everyone. I am a new writer here at Tworags and would like to introduce myself. My online nickname is Adanthar; I am a high stakes online tournament player and also play 5/10 to 10/20 NL. In between my day job as a non-profit lawyer, I've more or less been playing for a living since 2005.

For my first column, I'd like to talk about what I plan to do at Tworags. I firmly believe that the best way to get better is to analyze hands, and that's exactly what I do - I probably think about poker and post about it more than I play (which says as much about my work ethic as it does about my analytical skills, but never mind that.) Most mediocre to decent, but not great players do think about their borderline hands and try to avoid basic mistakes, but a lot of them take certain more basic poker "tenets" for granted. For example, they will never fold KK preflop because "the times you get KK vs. AA and AA vs. KK even out", they'll often slowplay the nuts no matter what the board looks like (or, vice versa, never slowplay the nuts regardless), and so on. The bottom line for many of these players is that they make big calls and big folds because "it's what you're supposed to do" and never think about the other player's hand range, what the other player expects from them, or the overall situation. In midstakes and high stakes no limit against good, thinking opponents, these mistakes are often more damaging than 90% of the marginal hands usually posted in places such as 2+2.

In the near future, I will try to post many examples of such hands and attempt to explain why they are more critical to your development as a player than most people would expect. In the meantime, I'd like to point our readers towards a new Bluff Magazine column written by Phil Galfond. In this column, he introduces a concept known as 'G-bucks' - basically, Sklansky dollars, but taken for your entire hand range as opposed to just the hand you actually have at the moment. This is a crucial part of what I'll be talking about over the next few weeks, and I encourage everyone reading this to stop and read that column - it's a great read.

Thanks for reading - hope to see you back at Tworags soon.